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THE AGGREGATE HARMONY METRIC
AND A STATISTICAL AND VISUAL
CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE
REHNQUIST COURT: 50 YEARS OF DATA
Peter A. Hook*
I. INTRODUCTION
An important anniversary went uncelebrated in the Harvard
Law Review's most recent review of the previous United States
Supreme Court term.' The November 2006 issue marked the fif-
tieth year that the Harvard Law Review published its annual ma-
trix of the inter-agreement amongst all of the Justices for a par-
ticular term.2 These matrices include both raw numbers and
* Electronic Services Librarian, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington;
Doctoral Student, School of Library and Information Science (SLIS), Indiana University-
Bloomington. (JD University of Kansas 1997, MSLIS University of Illinois 2000). Mr.
Hook researches in the area of information visualization. Particular interests include the
educational use of knowledge domain visualizations, concept mapping, and the spatial
navigation of bibliographic data in which the underlying structural organization of the
domain is conveyed to the user. Additional interests include social network theory,
knowledge organization systems, legal bibliometrics, and legal informatics. (The follow-
ing website contains color versions of the visualizations used in this article:
http://ella.slis.indiana.edu/-pahook/index.html.)
1. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372, 372-84 (2006).
2. The Harvard Law Review first published the annual matrix in 1957 (regarding
the 1956 Term), and has provided annual matrices ever since. See The Supreme Court,
1956 Term, 71 HARV. L. REV. 84, 103 (1957); The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV.
L. REV. 96, 103 (1958); The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 128, 133
(1959); The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REV. 95, 105 (1960); The Supreme
Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 80, 89 (1961); The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76
HARV. L. REV. 75, 85 (1962); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 79, 87
(1963); The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 177, 183 (1964); The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 103, 109 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 8t0
HARV. L. REV. 123, 145 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 110,
131 (1967); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 93, 307 (1968); The Su-
preme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 279 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1969
Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 30, 252 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 38, 351 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 301 (1972);
The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 304 (1973); The Supreme Court,
1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 275 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV.
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percentages as to how often any two Justices sided together on
cases for that particular term relative to the amount of cases the
two Justices heard together.' Aggregating this data over the fifty-
year span allows for some important insights and benchmarks as
to the last half century of the Supreme Court-the 1956 to 2005S 4
Terms. Given how often these or similar statistics are cited,
emulated,' compiled and/or reproduced, the aggregated, longi-
L. REV. 47,276 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 56,277 (1976);
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 296 (1977); The Supreme Court,
1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 328 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 60, 276 (1979); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 290 (1980);
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 340 (1981); The Supreme Court,
1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 305 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 70,296 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87,308 (1984);
The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 323 (1985); The Supreme Court,
1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 305 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101
HARV. L. REV. 119, 363 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143,
351 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 395 (1989); The Su-
preme Court, 1989 Term, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 360 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1990
Term, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 420 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 163, 379 (1992); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144,373 (1993);
The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 373 (1994); The Supreme Court,
1994 Term, 109 HARV. L. REV. 11l, 341 (1995); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, 110
HARV. L. REV. 135,368 (1996); The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197,
432 (1997); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 367 (1998); The Su-
preme Court, 1998 Term, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 401 (1999); The Supreme Court, 1999
Term-The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 391 (2000); The Supreme Court, 2000 Term,
115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 540 (2001); The Supreme Court, 2001 Term, 116 HARV. L. REV.
453, 454 (2002); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 481 (2003); The
Supreme Court, 2003 Term, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499 (2004); The Supreme Court, 2004
Term, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415,421 (2005); The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 372, 374 (2006). Hereinafter, each of the annual articles will be cited as follows: The
[year] Term. For example, the issue addressing the 2005 Term will be cited as The 2005
Term.
3. See supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism, and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1030 (2006); Walter E. Joyce, The Early Constitutoinal Jurispru-
dence of Justice Stephen G. Breyer: A Study of the Justice's First Year on the United States
Supreme Court, 7 SETON HALL. CONST. L.J. 149, 161;Michael Stokes Paulsen, Counting
Heads on RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 12 (1997); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the
Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 728 (2001);
Stephen J. Wermiel, Clarence Thomas After Ten Years: Some Reflections, 10 AM. U.J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 315, 316 (2002).
5. See Mark Tushnet, Taking Sides: Many Believe Political Differences Rend the
Rehnquist Court. But More Than Politics Are in Play, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2005,
at 38, available at http:l/www.legalaffairs.orglissues/March-April-2005/numbers
marapr05.msp. At least one group of authors has repeatedly applied the Harvard Law
Review's format and methodology to the voting patterns of the Indiana Supreme Court:
the Indiana Law Review has covered the voting patterns of the justices on the Indiana
Supreme Court since its 1991 term. See, e.g., Mark J. Crandley et al., An Examination of
the Indiana Supreme Court Docket, DLspositions, and Voting in 2005, 39 IND. L. REV. 733
(2006); Kevin W. Betz, An Examination of the Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Disposi-
tions, and Voting in 1991, 25 IND. L. REV. 1469 (1992).
Others have done a similar analysis as to various state supreme courts. See Christine
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tudinal data should be of interest to scholars, commentators, law
students, and the public at large.
Furthermore, these aggregated matrices of agreement allow
for interesting visualizations of the Supreme Court, both longi-
tudinally and year by year. Using existing software, measures of
agreement (and disagreement) allow for the Justices to be dis-
tributed spatially as to their ideological sympathies. Such spatial
visualizations quickly convey to the viewer which Justices are of-
ten in agreement, which are seldom in agreement, and which
Justices are outliers. The fifty-year perspective also allows schol-
M. Motta, Note, The Supreme Court of Alaska: Unique and Independent Like the People
of the Last Frontier, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1727, 1752 (1997); Stephen R. Barnett, Forward,
The Emerging Court, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1193 (1983); Nathan J. Kunz et al., Note,
Colorado Supreme Court Statistical Survey, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 605 (2005); Shane R.
Heskin, Note, Florida's State Constitutional Adjudication: A Significant Shift as Three
New Members Take Seats on the States Highest Court?, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1547 (1999);
Robert Bradley & S. Sidney Ulmer, An Examination of Voting Behavior in the Supreme
Court of Illinois: 1971-1975, 5 S. ILL. U. L.J. 245 (1980); Annual Review of Maryland Law:
Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1995-96 Opinions, 26 (1) U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1996);
Robert A. Marangola, Note, Independent State Constitutional Adjudication in Massachu-
setts: 1988-1998, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1625, 1675 (1998); Luke Bierman, The Dynamics of
State Constitutional Decision-Making: Judicial Behavior at the New York Court of Ap-
peals, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1403 (1995); Vincent Martin Bonventre, Court of Appeals-State
Constitutional Law Review, 1990, 12 PACE L. REV. 1 (1992) (discussing the New York
Court of Appeals); Harry C. Martin, Statistical Compilation of the Opinions of the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina Terms 1989-90 Through 1992-93, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1453
(1994); Michael West, Note, Arrested Development: An Analysis of the Oregon Supreme
Court's Free Speech Jurisprudence in the Post-Linde Years, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1237 (2000);
Glynna K. Parde, Note, Judicial Decision Making: A Statistical Analysis of the Tennessee
Supreme Court-1992 Term, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 325 (1994); James E. Bond & Kelly
Kunsch, A State Supreme Court in Transition, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 545 (2002) (dis-
cussing the Washington Supreme Court).
There is at least one study as to the voting alignment of a particular Federal Court of
Appeals. Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 644 (1985) (DC
Circuit).
There is also at least one study on intermediate state appellate courts. See Rochelle
Block & Jeffrey Laynor, Note, The Work of the Court of Appeals: A Statistical Miscel-
lany: July 1, 1985 Through June 30, 1986, 46 MD. L. REV. 891, 898 (1987) (The star (*)
footnote of this work cites several previous Maryland studies, including William L. Rey-
nolds, II, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance-Part 1, 37
MD. L. REV. 1,40-56 (1977) (September 1975 Term) and others.).
6. See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again:
Revisiting the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MINN. L. REV. 131, 190-191 (2001); Paul
H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Mathematics, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 90 (1996); Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the
Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1267, 1346-52 (1992); Linda Greenhouse, Court in
Transition: News Analysis; Consistently, A Pivotal Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at Al
(including a chart titled, "Agreement Among Supreme Court Justices: Percentage of
Times That Justices Agreed in Non-Unanimous Cases from the 1994-95 Term Through
the 2003-04 Term"); Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court's Helm, But He Isn't Yet in
Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 1 (including a chart titled, "Percentage of Times
That Pairs of Justices Agreed in Nonunanimous Decisions in the 2005-06 Term").
2007]
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ars of the court to set empirical benchmarks to evaluate individ-
ual terms. For instance, the 2005 term, with an aggregate agree-
ment of 70%, was the high water mark for agreement amongst
the Court over the past 50 terms.' At least one scholar has de-
scribed this as a "quiet term."' Now, with the Aggregate Har-
mony Metric, we can empirically demonstrate that the term was
unique. It was indeed a statistical outlier, a bit removed from the
mean of 60% total Justice agreement for the fifty-year span.
II. PRIOR WORK
A. VOTING ALIGNMENTS
The genesis for voting alignment matrices appears' to be the
work of C. Herman Pritchett in 1941."' Pritchett's 1941 article
contains a matrix of percentage agreement among the Justices in
controversial cases during the 1939 and 1940 Terms." After a
similar article in 1942 (which includes a table of the percentage
agreement among the Justices in all non-unanimous cases for the
1941 Term (Chart III)),12 Pritchett produced a lengthier treat-
ment of the subject in a 1948 book.'3 Table XXII of this work
consists of matrices of percentage agreements for all members of
the Court for all non-unanimous opinions of the Court for the
1931 through 1946 Terms.'4 A subsequent work by Pritchett con-
tains matrices of percentage agreements for all members of the
court for non-unanimous opinions of the Court for the 1946-1948
Terms (Table 5)5 and the 1949-1952 Terms (Table 7)."1
In addition to the Harvard Law Review, others have pub-
lished voting alignment and other data about the various terms
7. See infra Table 1 and Chart 1.
8. See Frederick Schauer, Forward, The Court's Agenda-and the Nation's, 120
HARV L. REv. 4, 32 (2006).
9. See J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Commentary, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 533,543 (1995).
10. C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 890. (1941). For a discussion of Pritchett's work
and other similar contributions, see Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of
Judging, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783, 786 (2003); G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of
the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (2005).
11. Pritchett, supra note 10, at 894 tbl. Ill.
12. C. Herman Pritchett, The Voting Behavior of the Supreme Court, 1941-42, 4 J.
POL. 491, 497 tbl. III (1942).
13. C. HERMAN PRITCHET, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES 1937-1947 (1948).
14. Il. at 240-48.
15. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 182
(1954).
16. Id. at 184.
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of the Court. John Sprague published voting alignment data for
as early as 1916.' 7 At least as early as for the 1995 term, United
States Law Week has published voting alignment matrices." In
addition, The National Law Journal also publishes voting align-
ment data.'9
Since the 1986 Term, a group of scholars has been publish-
ing annual reviews of the Supreme Court with data such as lib-
eral and conservative trends, voting for the government versus
voting for private parties, breakdowns by civil and criminal
cases, and other distinctions.2 ' Similar data is published in the
wonderfully detailed book, The Supreme Court Compendium:
Data, Decisions & Developments.' This work includes voting
alignments by issue area: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First
Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Eco-
nomics, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Fed-
eral Taxation, and Miscellaneous.22 The data for these tables
comes from a freely available database known as the U.S. Su-
preme Court Judicial Database."
The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database was created by
political scientist, Harold J. Spaeth,24 and is widely used by the
political science community. The database has been cited by law
school scholars, and some note its discrepancies 5 with the Har-
17. JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: CASES IN FEDERALISM, 1889-1959 (1968).
18. Thomas C. Goldstein, Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 1995, 65
U.S.L.W. 3029 (1996).
19. Marcia Coyle, An Activist Court Rules on Speech, Immigration and One Big
Election, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at Cl (including table titled "Voting Alignments on
the Supreme Court"); Marcia Coyle, New Trio Stands Up to Court's Hard Right, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at S1 (including table titled "Voting Alignments on the Supreme
Court: 1991-92 Term").
20. Robert E. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L.
15 (1988); Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior 2004 Term, 32
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 909 (2005).
21. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS
& DEVELOPMENTS (3d ed. 2003).
22. lIL at 524-87 (including tables for the Vinson Court, 1946-1952 Terms (Table 6-
4); the Warren Court, 1953-1968 Terms (Table 6-5); the Burger Court, 1969-1985 Terms
(Table 6-6); and the Rehnquist Court, 1986-2001 Terms (Table 6-7)).
23. The S. Sidney Ulmer Project: U.S. Supreme Court Databases,
http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm.
24. Id.; see also JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HARLOLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AI-rITUDINAL MODEL 32-73 (1993); Harold J.
Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base: Providing New
Insights into the Court, 83 JUDICATURE 228 (2000).
25. See Geraldine Mund, A Look Behind the Ruling: The Supreme Court and the
Unconstitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 78 AM. BANKRUPTCY L.J. 401, 421
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yard Law Review statistics. In the future I plan to compare my
results from the Harvard Law Review data against those from
the Supreme Court Database. Some feel that the Supreme Court
Database is more nuanced and transparent as to the processing
and categorization of the data.6 I personally found several minor
errors and inconsistencies with the Harvard statistics27 and found
myself wanting more information as to how the Harvard statis-
tics were compiled."
B. VISUALIZATIONS OF VOTING ALIGNMENTS
Over the years there have been several efforts to spatially
visualize the relationship of the Justices to one another." In
1941, Pritchett published a linear continuum of the Justices in
the 1939 and 1940 Terms based on their number of dissents.3" In
1951, Thurston and Degan used factorial analysis of the voting
patterns of the 1943 and 1944 Terms to produce three dimen-
sional vector space representations of the Justices." Starting in
1962, Schubert used multidimensional factor analysis (or scaling)
of Justice voting behavior to produce spatial distributions of the
(2004);
26. See Epstein et al., supra note 10.
27. For example, the article concerning the 1967 Term uses the wrong N value for
Justice Marshall relative to Justice Black. The N value should be 70 instead of 170 to be
consistent with the other N values for Justice Marshall and the resultant percentages in
the five year table on p. 311 of the same volume. See The 1967 Term, supra note 2, at 307,
311. For the 1977 Term, the P value should be 91.9 rather than 93.6, based on the O, S, T,
& N values given for Justice Marshall relative to Justice Brennan. See The 1977 Term,
supra note 2, at 328. For the 1985 Terms, there is a discrepancy as to the N value of Jus-
tice Powell relative to Justice White. It is 155 on one half of the matrix and 156 on the
other half. The 1985 Term, supra note 2, at 305. 1 used the 155 value for my calculations
as Justice Powell did not sit with any other Justice 156 times for that particular Term.
However, he did sit with several other Justices a total of 155 times.
28. For example, Table C and note I in the section addressing the 1956 Term statis-
tics indicate that there were thirty-three unanimous cases for the 1956 Term, "[i]ncluding
8 cases decided with concurring votes." The 1956 Term, supra note 2, at 103. Does this
mean concurring in the judgment and the reasoning, or just the judgment? In the later
case, only 25 are truly unanimous by later Harvard standards.
29. See G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 1089 (2005) (discussing early statistical efforts that have produced spatial distribu-
tions of the Justices in order to find the spatial or ideological center of the Supreme
Court).
3(1. Pritchett, supra note 8, at 894. For a more recent approach as to linear, spatial
modeling taking into account more variables and in the context of the confirmation proc-
ess see Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents,
Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SC. 96
(1992).
31. L.L. Thurstone & J.W. Degan, A Factorial Study of the Supreme Court, 37
PROC. OFTHE NAT'L ACAD. OF SC. OF THE U.S. 628 (1951).
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Justices. 2 In 1985, Spaeth and Altfeld produced spatial, though
non-automated, diagrams of the influence relationships amongst
the Justices for the Warren and Burger Courts.3 More recently,
Martin and Quinn used Markov chain Monte Carlo methods
with a Bayesian measurement model to produce spatial distribu-
tions of Justices based on their voting behavior."
Other political scientists are using other statistical tech-
niques based in part on voting behavior to produce spatial distri-
butions of the Justices. 3' Network science researchers Johnson,
Borgatti, and Romney have used network science and corre-
spondence analysis techniques to produce visual representations
of the later Rehnquist Court voting patterns.'6 Mathematician,
Lawrence Sirovich, used vector models and singular value de-
composition to produce two dimensional representations of the
voting patterns of the Rehnquist Court.37 In addition, there have
been numerous line charts showing various aspects of the work
of the court. For instance, Epstein and her collaborators pub-
lished a line chart showing the "Percentage of U.S. Supreme
Court Cases with at Least One Dissenting Opinion, 1800-2000
Terms.
,,36
32. Glendon Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100 (1963); Glendon Schu-
bert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis, 56 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 90 (1962).
33. Harold J. Spaeth & Michael F. Altfeld, Influence Relationships within the Su-
preme Court: A Comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts, 38 W. POL. Q. 70-83
(1985).
34. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS
134 (2002); see also Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 797; Andrew D. Martin et al., The
Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005); Lee Ep-
stein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who When, and How Im-
portant?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available cit http://www.
law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/8/LRColl2007n8Epstein.pdf.
35. See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space (April 14, 2005) (research
paper prepared for the Northwestern Faculty Conference, Law and Positive Political
Theory: Legal Doctrine and Political Control, April 29, 2005), available at
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/conferences/research/Epstein.pdf.
36. Jeffrey C. Johnson et al., Analysis of Voting Patterns in U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions (February 16-20, 2005) (research paper prepared for Sunbelt XXV, Inter-
national Sunbelt Social Network Conference, Redondo Beach, CA), abstract available cit
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/-ssnconf/conf/SunbeltXXVProgram.pdf.
37. Lawrence Sirovich, A pattern analysis of the second Rehnquist U.S. Supreme
Court, 100 PNAS 7432 (2(103).
38. Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 787.
2007]
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C. MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING (MDS) AND THE LAW
As this article utilizes Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), it is
appropriate to survey the use of the technique by legal scholars
generally, as well as those that have used it to produce spatial
distributions of Supreme Court Justices based on their voting
behavior. Most references in the law review literature are either
by psychologists or health professionals, people citing psycholo-
gists or health professionals, people writing about psychological
or health themes, or in law and psychology or law and health re-
lated journals." For instance, Blumenthal used multidimensional
scaling to produce spatial distributions of various crimes based
on the public's perception of the seriousness of the various
crimes. 40 Also, there is a group of scholars that has employed
MDS to map social networks associated with various legal issues.
These publications include spatial maps of the networks"' that
are very similar to those produced in information science or so-
cial network science. Additionally, this author did a MDS analy-
sis of top level West Topics in Supreme Court opinions over a
sixty year span with the goal of creating a domain map of the
Supreme Court topic space for teaching purposes.
The use of MDS to produce visualizations of voting patterns
in courts appears to have originated from its use to produce
visualizations of Congressional roll-call votes."3 Grofman and
Brazill have applied MDS to voting patterns of the Supreme
Court. However, their focus has been to reduce the multidimen-
39. See Michael T. Heaney, Brokering Health Policy: Coalitions, Parties, and In-
terest Group Influence, 31 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 887 (2006); Maggie E. Reed et al.,
There's No Place Like Home; Sexual Harassment of Low Income Women in Housing, 11
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 439 (2005);
40. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime: A Multidimensional Analysis with
Implications for Law and Psychology, 38 McGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=942311
41. John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and
Social Distance, 37 L. & SOC'Y REV. 5, 25, 31 (2003); John P. Heinz et al., The Constitu-
encies of Elite Urban Lawyers, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 441, 444, 452, 458 (1997); John P.
Heinz & Peter M. Manikas, Networks Among Elites in a Local Criminal Justice System,
26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 831, 842, 847 (1992); Robert L. Nelson et al., Lawyers and the
Structure of Influence in Washington, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 237, 289 (1988).
42. Peter A. Hook, Visualizing the Topic Space of the United States Supreme Court.
(Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 68), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=948759. Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Scientometrics
and Informetrics (ISSI 2007), Madrid, Spain, June 25-27, pp. 387-96, working paper ver-
sion (June 22, 2007).
43. See KEITH T. POOLE, SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING (2005);
Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme
Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of "Natural Courts" 1953-1991, 112
PUB. CHOICE 55, 55 n.1 (2002).
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sional space to one dimension. In other words, they use MDS to
produce a linear continuum of the Justices serving on any par-
ticular natural court (composed of nine Justices) to identify the
central or median Justice. At least one scholar has produced
two dimensional layouts of a particular Court term using MDS.49
However, the resultant visualizations are contained on a course
website and appear to be more of a demonstration of the tech-
nique than an attempt to garner insight into the Supreme
Court."
D. NETWORK VISUALIZATIONS AND THE LAW
Because this article uses network visualization techniques to
visualize the relationship of the Justices based on their voting
behavior, it is appropriate to survey the growing body of legal
scholars doing similar work with legal networks. Smith, Cross
and their collaborators utilize a dataset of the citation interlink-
ages of every federal and state case on Lexis as well as the cita-
tion interlinkages of 385,000 legal journal articles.4 1 Chandler
utilizes the software program Mathematica to evaluate a dataset
of the citation interlinkages amongst Supreme Court cases from
1831 to 2005. Chandler has also written on the network struc-
ture of the Uniform Commercial Code. Political scientist
Fowler and his collaborators also utilize the citation interlink-
ages for Supreme Court cases retrieved by automated means
from Lexis to identify outwardly important cases and inwardly
important cases."' The CITE-IT Project analyzes the citation
network of federal level regulatory takings cases."
44. Grofman & Brazill, supra note 43.
45. See Poli 100B Congress, 2 February 2006, http://voteview.com/congress-
UCSD_2_February_2006.htm.
46. /d.
47. Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith, & Antonio Tomarchio, Determinants of Co-
hesion in the Supreme Court's Network of Precedents (Aug. 2006) (U of Texas Law, Law
and Econ Research Paper No. 90, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-67), available t
http:/ssrn.comlabstract=924110; Frank B. Cross & Thomas A. Smith, The Reagan Revo-
lution in the Network of Law (June 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909217;
Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law (Spring 2005) (San Diego Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 06-11), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642863.
48. Seth J. Chandler, The Network Structure of Supreme Court Jurisprudence (June
10, 2005) (University of Houston Law Center No. 2005-W-07), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=742065.
49. Seth J. Chandler, The Network Structure of the Uniform Commercial Code: It's
A Small World After All (2005) (paper presented at the 2005 Wolfram Technology Con-
ference), available at http://library.wolfram.com/infocenter/Conferences/5800/.
50. James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal lm-
portance of Supreme Court Precedents, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007); James H. Fowler,
Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 456
20071
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III. METHODOLOGY
A. DATA HARVESTING AND MATRIX ALGEBRA
The data for this article comes mostly from the Harvard
Law Review's annual statistical review of the Supreme Court
term. The author placed each year's data into a standardized
spreadsheet matrix that had columns and rows for each Justice
that participated in an issued opinion during the applicable time
span-the 1956 to 2005 Terms (roughly October 1956 to July
2006).5' The author created one such spreadsheet per term for
each of the different Harvard Law Review counting methods
(o,54 S,5 D, 56 N 7)". Relying on a consistent ordering of the Jus-
(2006); James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent,
Soc. NETWORKS (forthcoming 2007), available at http://jhfowler.ucsd.edul..
51. Wayne McIntosh et al., Using Information Technology to Examine the Com-
munication of Precedent: Initial Findings and Lessons From the CITE-IT Project (Mar.
17-19, 2005) (paper prepared for the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Sci-
ence Association, Oakland, California), available at http://www.bsos.umd.
edu/gvpt/CITE-IT/Documents/Mclntosh %20etal%202005 %20WPSA.pdf.
52. See supra note 2.
53. See infra Table 2.
54. The 0 method counts the number of agreements in "opinions of the Court (0)"
as indicated by the cell corresponding with any two Justices for that particular term. The
1956 Term, supra note 2, at 103 tbl. IV, n.k. Subsequent issues would define the method
as follows: " '0' represents the number of decisions in which a particular pair of Justices
agreed in an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court."
The 2005 Term, supra note 2, at 376 tbl. I, n.g.
55. The S method counts the number agreements in "separate opinions including
concurrences and dissents" as indicated by the cell corresponding with any two Justices
for that particular term. The 1956 Term, supra note 2, at 103 tbl. IV, n.k. Subsequent is-
sues would define the method as follows: " 'S' represents the number of decisions in
which two Justices agreed in any opinion separate from the opinion of the Court. Justices
who together join more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have
agreed only once." The 2005 Term, supra note 2, at 376 tbl. I, n.g. The language as to Jus-
tices who "join more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have agreed
only once," did not come about until the 1996 Term. The 1996 Term, supra note 2, at 433
tbl. I, n.f. Thus, one would have to look at actual cases and voting patterns to see if the
method was done consistently over the entire dataset.
56. The D method was introduced for the review of the 1987 term. " 'D' represents
the number of decisions in which the two Justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting,
or concurring opinion." The 1987 Term, supra note 2, at 252 tbl. I, n.f. It was in response
to the problem of aggregated 0 and S totals leading to greater than 100 percent agree-
ment. See id. ("It should be noted that the 'P' totals have been computed differently than
they have in past versions of this table. In the past, the 'P' line was calculated by dividing
the sum of the '0' and 'S' lines by 'N.' This method of calculation overstated P whenever
two Justices had agreed more than once in any one decision.")
57. The N method counts "the number of times that the Justices participated in the
same case." The 1956 Term, supra note 2, at 103 tbl. IV, n.k. Subsequent definitions were
very similar: " 'N' represents the number of decisions in which both Justices participated,
and thus the number of opportunities for agreement." The 2005 Term, supra note 2, at
376 tbl. I, n.g.
58. The T method is merely the count of overall agreement, 0 plus S. Because this
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tices, it was then easy to aggregate the data for each of the indi-
vidual terms using Microsoft Excel. In other words, for each
method type (0, S, D, and N), the author created one workbook
file that had fifty individual sheets whose cell contents could eas-
ily be aggregated on the fifty-first sheet using the function:
SUM(Sheetl:Sheet50!E3) where E3 was a particular cell. Thus,
the Aggregate Harmony Metric is the aggregation of all 0 cells
divided by the aggregation of all N cells (ZO / ZN ). These per-
centages were easily generated with a simple Excel function such
as: Sheetl!D3/Sheet3!D3 where the cells in Sheet 1 contained all
of the aggregated 0 values and the cells in Sheet 3 contained all
of the aggregated N values."
B. MDS (MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING)
The visualizations that are Charts 4 and 5 were produced
with the multidimensional scaling (MDS) algorithm embedded
in the R statistical software package."" The mathematics and
principles behind MDS have been written about extensively
6l
and will not be replicated here. Because the technique is based
on the notion of distance, I subtracted the co-voting percentages
from 100 to get distance integers-the larger the number, the
greater the distance between Justices and vice-versa. Poole elo-
quently analogizes the MDS layout process to that of taking the
mileage matrix of miles between cities found on many highway
maps and creating a spatial distribution of the cities from that
matrix. 2 It is worth noting that with data that is not inherently
spatial to begin with, there might be inherent stress in making
everything fit. Also, a user can decide how many dimensions to
which he or she wants to reduce the data with differing levels of
stress. Because the first two dimensions capture the most vari-
ance in the data, these are what are represented in Charts 4 and
5.
The MDS algorithm is a deterministic process. This means
that repeated processing of the data will produce similar spatial
could be derived automatically from the 0 and S matrices, the author did not input the
data for this value by hand. The same is also true for the P Method. This is true whether
"P" is derived by dividing "T" by "N" (T/N) as it was prior to the 1987 Term or by divid-
ing "D" by "N" as it was for the 1987 Term and following.
59. See infra Table 2.
60. Free software is available at The R Project for Statistical Computing,
http:lwww.r-project.orgl.
61. See JOSEPH B. KRUSKAL & MYRON WISH, MUTLIDIMENSIONAL SCALING
(1978); Blumenthal, supra note 40; Grofman & Brazill supra note 43.
62. POOLE, supra note 43, at 1.
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distributions. (However, the image might be inverted up or
down or left to right. It is as if the same two-dimensional slice
through the solution space were viewed upside down or from the
other side.) Stress tests reveal how well the variability of the data
is captured by the chosen amount of dimensions. After conduct-
ing stress tests as to Supreme Court co-voting data, Grofman
and Brazil were comfortable reducing all of the voting space to
one dimension (a linear continuum) and note that a two-space
solution "almost perfectly explain(ed) the data." 3 This is fortu-
nate as two-space, or two-dimensional, solutions are perfect for
printed visualizations.
C. NETWORK VISUALIZATIONS
To produce additional visualizations of the voting relation-
ships on the Court64, I used the spring force layout algorithm
embedded in the network analysis software Pajek."' Network
analysis is based on nodes and links. As to my data, the Supreme
Court Justices became the nodes, and the links between them
were a varying quantity corresponding to their percentage co-
voting agreement. The spring force layout algorithm used by the
software is analogous to all the nodes being pulled together by
rubber bands with the strength of the pull (and thus the prox-
imity of the layout of the nodes) determined by the weight of the
link. (Links are sometimes called edges and in this case are
measure of co-voting percentages.) The layout algorithm is sto-
chastic. This means that repeated processing of the data will
produce different images. However, with complex node and link
structures, the resultant images look more or less the same. (The
orientation may be different and some nodes will be slightly dif-
ferent compared to each other.) However, the advantage of the
network layout approach is that it can accommodate instances in
which there are no ties between nodes as in the layout of all the
63. Grofman & Brazill, supra note 43, at 58; see also Martin et al., supra note 34, at
1281 n.26 ("Nearly all statistical work on the United States Supreme Court suggests that
the issue space is single-dimensional." (citing Grofman & Brazill, supra note 43, at 58)).
64. See infra Charts 3, 7, and 8.
65. Networks/Pajek: Program for Large Network Analysis, http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.
si/pub/networks/pajek/ (providing information and links to the Pajek software); see also
WOUTER DE NOOY ET AL., EXPLORATORY SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH PAJEK
(Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences Series No. 27, 2005); Vladimir Batagelj & An-
drej Mrvar, Pajek-Analysis and Visualization of Large Networks, in GRAPH DRAWING
SOFTWARE 77 (Mathematics and Visualization Series, Michael Jnger & Petra Mutzel
eds., 2003); Vladimir Batagelj & Andrej Mrvar, Pajek-Progran for Large Network
Analysis, 21(2) CONNECTIONS 47 (1998).
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Justices in the fifty-year dataset. MDS, because it is based on
distance, cannot handle such a structure in which there are enti-
ties that have no relationships. (A zero value corresponds to no
distance and the two items are thought to be right on top of each
other.)
IV. OBSERVATIONS, INSIGHTS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
A. AGGREGATE HARMONY METRIC
The impetus for the Aggregate Harmony Metric is my de-
sire to produce normalized spatial visualizations of the voting
agreement per term for the entire fifty years of the dataset. In
other words, I want to produce visualizations similar to Charts 4
and 5 for each Term of the Court and then combine them in an
animation. However, it occurred to me that for the more rancor-
ous, divisive terms that the Justices should be displayed further
apart in the voting space. Similarly, for terms with high aggre-
gate agreement, the Justices should be portrayed closer together.
The Aggregate Harmony Metric functions as a simple means to
make such an evaluation.
Table 1 provides the Aggregate Harmony Metric for each
Term of the Court in the column labeled Aggregate Percentage
Agreement (0 Method). As can be seen from the line graph in
Chart 1, the aggregate percentage agreement for the Court ap-
pears to seesaw through the fifty years of the dataset-from a
low of 50% to a high of 70%. The low value of 50% is for the
1970 Term. This was the outset of the change of direction from
the more liberal Warren Court to the more conservative Burger
Court. Justice Blackmun had just been appointed and was still
voting solidly with his childhood friend, Chief Justice Burger
(78% voting agreement using the Harvard Law Review 0
Method6 8).61 Indeed, a contemporaneous account observed that
"the Warren Court momentum has been brought to a screeching
halt ' 7 by the two new Nixon appointees Burger and Blackmun.
66. See infra Chart 3.
67. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005).
68. See The 1970 Terni, supra note 2, at 351.
69. This is in marked contrast to the voting agreement (0 Method) for the last term
the two served together (1985), which was 48%. The 1985 Term, supra note 2, at 305.
70. The 1970 Term, supra note 2, at 40 (citing Philip B. Kurland, The Burger Court
Shows Its Stripes, 18 LAW SCH. REC. 7,9 (1971) (University of Chicago Law School)).
2007]
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At first glance, an Aggregate Harmony Metric of 50% seems
implausible.7 As to the 1970 Term, however, of the 122 full opin-
ions, less than 20% were unanimous (23).72 Furthermore, "there
were fifteen major cases ... in which the Court was so split that
the cases were decided without a majority opinion."73 This is in
contrast to two such cases for each of the two previous terms.1
4
Additionally, seven cases were decided by a four to four vote7"
and there were twenty cases decided by a four to five vote."
Contrast this to the 2005 Term in which 44% of the cases
were unanimous (36 out of 81)77 and there were only nine, five to
four decisions." This "quiet" year had the highest Aggregate
Harmony Metric (70%) of the entire fifty-term span. This was
most likely the result of several things: (1) O'Connor participat-
ing in twenty-four of the least controversial written opinions at
the beginning of the term while Alito was going through the con-
firmation process; (2) the transition time after O'Connor's an-
nounced retirement and Rehnquist's death in which the Court
might have been less likely to grant certiorari in controversial
cases; and (3) efforts as to consensus building by the new Chief
Justice Roberts. Table 3 displays the mean, median, mode, and
various quartile distributions for all fifty of the Aggregate Har-
mony Metric values.
Table 4 reports the Aggregate Harmony Metric values for
the tenure of each of the Chief Justices in the dataset. Consistent
with the conventional understanding of the history of the Su-
preme Court, the Burger Court was a transitional time between
the more liberal Warren Court and the more conservative
Rehnquist Court. As might be expected, the Court of transition
(the Burger Court) has a lower Aggregate Harmony value
(57%) than either the Warren Court (59%) or the Rehnquist
Court (60%). Table 5 and Chart 2 tell a similar story at a finer
scale of gradation (Five Term bins). One scholar has noted a
71. Assume that there were 100 cases for the term and all were decided by a five to
four vote by the same block of Justices in the majority and in the dissent. This would
yield an Aggregate Harmony Metric of 28% as the four dissenting Justices are not
counted (using the 0 Method) as having sided with either the 5 majority Justices or each
of themselves. Thus, ZO = 1000 and FN = 3600 and the Aggregate Harmon Metric (ZO/
ZN) = .2777.
72. The 1970 Term, supra note 2, at 349.
73. Ild. at 352.
74. Id.
75. ht. at 353
76. It.
77. The 2005 Term, supra note 2, at 377.
78. ild. at 378.
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change in the voting blocks of close decisions immediately after
Bush v. Gore."9 One can look at the Aggregate Harmony Metric
values to see that the 2000 Term (the year that the divisive opin-
ion came out early in the Term) was itself higher than the me-
dian (61%), that the 2001 Term took a dip below the median
(58%), that the 2002 Term was well above the median (63%),
and that the remaining Rehnquist Terms (2003 and 2004) were
again at the median (59%).
B. VOTING SUPERLATIVES
One benefit of having aggregated the Harvard Law Re-
view's statistics for all fifty Terms (1956-2005) is the ability to see
the highest and lowest voting agreement percentages between
any two Justices over the span of the dataset. Tables 1, 2, 4, 6, 7,
8, and 9 and Chart 9 report various aspects of these voting super-
latives. One can see that Warren and Marshall are at a fifty-year
high for those having decided more than 100 cases together
(88%)."' Indeed, Stephen Wermiel noted Marshall's proclivity to
vote with Brennan in his analysis of the first ten years of Justice
Thomas's tenure on the Court in regards to the assertion that
Thomas was a "Scalia clone.""' In fact, the percentage of voting
agreement between Scalia and Thomas for the time range of the
dataset is 67%.12 This value is not even in the top twenty-five. "
Nor is it even in the forth quartile. ' Similarly, the polemic na-
ture of Justice Douglas is evident in the fact that he is one of the
Justices in each of the first six, lowest voting agreement percent-
ages."
There is utility in such measures. For one, the data might be
of use to those scholars evaluating the "Freshman Effect." 6
79. David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427 (2006).
80. See infra Table 7.
81. See Wermiel, supra note 4, at 316.
82. See infra Table 2.
83. See infra Table 7.
84. See infra Table 10.
85. See infra Table 8.
86. See Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb II, Reassessing the "Freshman Effect": The
Voting Bloc Alignment of New Justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921-90, 15
POL. BEHAV. 1 (1993); Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb, II, Freshman Opinion Writing on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 1921-1991, 76 JUDICATURE 239 (1993); Saul Brenner, Another
Look at Freshman Indecisiveness on the United States Supreme Court, 16 POLITY 320
(1983); Robert L. Dudley, The Freshman Effect and Voting Alignments: A Reexamination
of Judicial Folklore, 21 AM. POL. RES. 360 (1993); Edward V. Heck & Melinda Gann
Hall, Bloc Voting and the Freshman Justice Revisited, 43 J. POL. 852 (1981); Christopher
E. Smith, The Impact of New Justices: The U.S. Supreme Court and Criminal Justice, 30
AKRON L. REV. 55 (1996); see also David W. Allen, Voting Blocs and the Freshman Jus-
2007]
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Also, it provides an empirical means of assigning labels. For in-
stance, those in the fourth quartile might be considered ideologi-
cal allies while those in the first quartile might be considered
ideological opponents. Additionally, I plan to use the data to
modify subsequent spatial layouts of the Justices based on their
voting agreements. For instance, for those Justices whose voting
agreements place them in the second and third quartiles, I plan
to retain their actual distances as represented by the layout algo-
rithm. However, I think it would be useful to double the distance
of those in the first quartile and halve the distances for those in
the forth quartile." This "distortion" would serve to heighten the
relationships between Justices and reveal more strongly those
that are ideologically close together and those that are ideologi-
cally far apart.
C. VISUALIZATIONS
As an information science researcher, I am actively involved
in the creation of knowledge domain visualizations (KDVs).
KDVs are the "graphic rendering of bibliometric data designed
to provide a global view of a particular domain, the structural
details of a domain, the salient characteristics of a domain (its
dynamics, most cited authors or papers, bursting concepts, etc.)
or all three."' KDVs (also known as domain maps) respond to
the desire of cognitive and educational psychologists to give
learners "a big picture, a schema, a holistic cognitive struc-
ture[." Chart 3 provides such a big picture overview of the last
fifty terms of the Supreme Court. There is an implied element of
time moving from left to right. Viewers get a rough sense as to
which Justices served with whom. Long serving Justices are
pulled to the center of the diagram.
Additionally, it is my vision that Chart 3 will soon function
as the navigational frontispiece of an online, informational web-
site about the Court. By selecting two Justices, viewers would
see their co-voting percentages as well as how these percentages
compared to their contemporaries on the Court. Furthermore,
lice on State Supreme Courts, 44 W. POL. Q. 727 (1991).
87. See infra Table 10.
88. Peter A. Hook & Katy B6rner, Educational Knowledge Domain Visualizations:
Tools to Navigate, Understand, and Internalize the Structure of Scholarly Knowledge and
Expertise, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COGNITIVE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 187, 194
(Amanda Spink & Charles Cole eds., 2005).
89. CHARLES K. WEST ET AL., INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN: IMPLICATIONS FROM
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 58 (1991).
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users would be able to select a particular Term and only those
Justices that served on the Court for that Term would be high-
lighted. The rest would be grayed out. Users could then navigate
to MDS spatial distributions of the Justices for that particular
Term and, aggregated with data from other recent terms, the
spatial distributions for particular topics (free speech, federal-
ism, criminal procedure, etc.)
Charts 4 and 5 are MDS produced spatial distributions of
the co-voting percentages in non-unanimous cases of the longest
serving group of the same nine Justices of the entire fifty-year
dataset (1994 to 2003 Terms)-a large chunk of the Rehnquist
Court. Chart 4, the aggregate co-voting figures for this time
makes the ideological landscape of the court readily available to
a novice. One can see that Scalia and Thomas are ideological al-
lies far removed from the more liberal wing of the Court (Ste-
vens, Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer). One can readily perceive
that Stevens is the most marginalized Justice and most apt to go
his own way. One can also see the most pronounced five to four
voting block for this time (O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
Scalia and Thomas, versus Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and
Breyer). "
Chart 5 is the MDS produced spatial distribution of the co-
voting percentages in non-unanimous cases for the same time
period (1994 to 2003 Terms) that the Harvard Law Review has
identified in its Table of Contents for its annual review of the
Court Term as dealing with Freedom of Speech and Expres-
sion." One can see that as compared to Chart 4, Stevens has
moved from being marginalized to assuming the role of a cen-
trist. Furthermore, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas have them-
selves become marginalized and have moved away from each
other. I do not pretend to be a constitutional scholar in the area
of free speech. This calls attention to the issue that most visuali-
zations should be validated by experts in the field to expose er-
rors. For instance, maybe one or more of the cases identified as
dealing with Freedom of Speech and Expression by the Harvard
Law Review in its Table of Contents is only marginally so and
significantly distorts the visualization.
90. See infra Chart 6.
91. There are a total of twenty-five cases, which include, for example, Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003). (Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003), was not included because it
was a nine to zero decision.)
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Chart 6 emphasizes that O'Connor's change from one vot-
ing bloc to the next accounts for 63% of all five to four decisions
(1994 to 2003 Terms) 2 Thus, she is a quintessential swing vote.
Furthermore, when Kennedy votes with the four liberal Justices
this accounts for an additional 8% of all 5 to 4 decisions." The
two of them together, covering just these three different voting
bloc scenarios, account for 71% of all 5 to 4 decisions during the
1994 to 2003 Terms. 4 The status of O'Connor and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Kennedy, as swing voters is visually portrayed in Charts 7
and 8. In Chart 7, using the network graphic metaphor (nodes
and edges), the lines between the Justices represent those voting
together greater than 50% of the time in non-unanimous cases.
This effectively communicates O'Connor's swing vote status be-
tween the liberal and conservative voting blocs for the time span.
When the threshold is lowered by a mere percentage point as is
the case in Chart 8, it can be seen that Kennedy also serves as an
occasional swing vote between the liberal and conservative vot-
ing blocs. These visualizations effectively convey to a novice
what almost every constitutional scholar or political scientist al-
ready knows. Just how effectively awaits rigorous user testing.
V. CONCLUSION
The Aggregate Harmony Metric is a tool to evaluate the
relative rancorousness of the various terms of the Supreme
Court. The insight from this metric is enhanced by knowledge of
the all time high or low co-voting percentages between the Jus-
tices. Additionally, visualizations help to make the knowledge of
veteran Court watchers quickly available and digestible to nov-
ices. All of this work responds to my desire to provide insights as
to the Court for use in teaching (pedagogy). I think that metrics
and visualizations can go a long way towards making the tacit
knowledge of expert scholars of the Court available to both law
students and the general public. Hard work, data mining, statisti-
cal data crunching, and visualization tools with built-in layout al-
92. O'Connor voted with Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas against Stevens.
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter eighty-two times. O'Connor voted with Stevens, Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter against Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas twenty-eight
times. These totals, 82 plus 28 (110), account for 63% of the 175 5 to 4 votes for the time
period. See the articles addressing the 1994 to 2003 Terms, supra note 2.
93. Kennedy voted eight times with Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter against
O'Connor, Rehnquiest, Scalia, and Thomas. See the articles addressing the 1994 to 2003
Terms, supra note 2.
94. This is 124 of all of the 175, 5 to 4 decisions.
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gorithms assist in making this possible. It is my hope that the
field of information visualization as it relates to legal topics is
still in its infancy and ripe for substantial growth.
Table 1A - Aggregate Harmony Metric (YOIY-N)
(1956-2005 Terms)
Aggregate Per-
Court centage Agreement
(0 Method)
Warren 3 & 4
Warren 4
Warren 5
Warren 5
Warren 5
Warren 5 & 6
Warren 7
Warren 7
Warren 7
Warren 8
Warren 8
Warren 9
Warren 9
Burger 1
Burger 2
Burger 3
Burger 3
Burger 3
Burger 3
Burger 3 & 4
Burger 4
Burger 4
57
56
58
51
55
62
59
67
58
64
59
65
62
62
50
64
55
56
59
58
55
51
Cumulative Cumulative
0 Count N Count
2069
2351
2206
1878
2257
1672
2245
2957
1817
2095
2412
2624
2389
1558
2118
2311
3140
3079
2779
2905
2693
2279
3631
4188
3795
3651
4120
2681
3825
4440
3146
3298
4104
4023
3835
2509
4244
4279
5666
5479
4692
5050
4890
4458
Term
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
2007]
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1978 Burger 4 55 2597 4707
1979 Burger 4 54 2801 5193
1980 Burger 4 54 2614 4805
1981 Burger 5 54 3187 5887
1982 Burger 5 58 3361 5792
1983 Burger 5 65 3689 5697
1984 Burger 5 66 3253 4965
1986 Burger 5 56 3136 5610
1986 Rehnquist 1 56 2998 5385
1987 Rehnquist 2 66 2904 4403
1988 Rehnquist 2 61 3087 5040
1989 Rehnquist 2 63 2633 4988
1990 Rehnquist 3 60 2505 4192
1991 Rehnquist 4 i 55 2119 3864
1992 Rehnquist 4 63 2566 4104
1993 Rehnquist 5 59 1830 3108
1994 Rehnquist 6 64 1947 3041
1995 Rehnquist 6 64 1813 2820
1996 Rehnquist 6 65 2002 3088
1997 Rehnquist 6 68 2261 3340
1998 Rehnquist 6 59 1703 2900
1999 Rehnquist 6 60 1652 2772
2000 Rehnquist 6 61 1859 3057
2001 Rehnquist 6 58 1665 2868
2002 Rehnquist 6 63 1765 2784
2003 Rehnquist 6 59 1682 2833
2004 Rehnquist 6 59 1629 2756
2005 Roberts 1 & 2 70 1914 2749
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Table 1B - Court Composition and Number of Full Opinions
(1956-2005 Terms)
Justices (When more than 9 justices are
involved in issuing opinions for a particular
term, those present for only part of the term
are denoted with the number of written cases
decided in which they participated. This
number is determined by the highest number
of cases in which two justices participated
(the Harvard N number) that includes the
particular justice sitting for only part of a
term.)
1956 Warren 3 & 4
1957 Warren 4
1958 Warren 5
1959 Warren 5
1960 Warren 5
1961 Warren 5 & 6
1962 Warren 7
1963 Warren 7
1964 Warren 7
1965 Warren 8
1966 Warren 8
1967 Warren 9
1968 Warren 9
1969 Burger I
1970 Burger 2
Black, Reed (42), Frankfurter, Douglas, Bur-
ton, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Brennan,
Whittaker (39)
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, Clark,
Warren, Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Warren,
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Warren,
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Warren,
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Warren,
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker (34), Stewart,
White (16)
Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren-
nan, Stewart, White, Goldberg
Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren-
nan, Stewart, White, Goldberg
Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren-
nan, Stewart, White, Goldberg
Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren-
nan, Stewart, White, Fortas
Black, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Harlan, Bren-
nan, Stewart, White, Fortas
Black, Douglas, Warren, Harlan, Brennan,
Stewart, White, Fortas, Marshall
Black, Douglas, Warren, Harlan, Brennan,
Stewart, White, Fortas, Marshall
Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart,
White, Marshall, Burger (8 JUSTICES
ONLY)
Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart,
White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun
"Full
Opin-
ions..
2007]
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1971 r Burger 3
1972 Burger 3
1973 Burger 3
1974 Burger 3
1975 Burger 3 & 4
1976 Burger 4
1977 Burger 4
1978 Burger 4
1979 Burger 4
1980 Burger 4
1981 Burger 5
1982 i Burger 5
1983 Burger 5
1984 I Burger 5
1985 Burger 6
1986 Rehnquist 1
1987 Rehnquist 2
1988 Rehnquist 2
1989 Rehnquist 2
1990 Rehnquist 3
1991 Rehnquist 4
1992 Rehnquist 4
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall,
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall,
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall,
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall,
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist
Douglas (5), Brennan, Stewart, White, Mar-
shall, Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
Stevens (80)
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor
Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Ste-
vens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter
White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas
White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas
151
164
157
137
159
142
135
138
149
138
167
162
163
151
19
152
142
143
139
120
114
114
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1993 Rehnqu ist 5 Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, 87
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg
1994 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 86
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
1995 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 75
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
1996 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 86
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
1997 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 93
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
1998 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 81
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
1999 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 77
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
2000 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 86
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
2001 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- I1
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
2002 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 78
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
2003 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 80
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
2004 Rehnquist 6 Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken- 79
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
2005 Roberts I & 2 Stevens, O'Connor (24), Scalia, Kennedy, 81
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts,
Alito (40)
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Table 1C - Superlatives (Highest & Lowest Percentage Agreement
per Term (0 Method) (1956-2005 Terms)
Highest %
Term % Agree-
ment
Justice 1
1956 F85- Reed
1957 71 Black
Warren
1958 72 Clark
Whittaker
1959 78 Warren
1960 74 Warren
1961 94 Clark
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
83
90
89
87
85
90
92
83
78
69
80
Warren
Warren
Warren
Warren
Warren
Warren
Warren
Brennan
Brennan
Burger
Stewart
Burger
Highest
% Agree-
ment
Justice 2
Clark
Warren
Brennan
Whittaker
Stewart
Brennan
Brennan
White
Brennan
Brennan
Brennan
Brennan
Brennan
Brennan
Brennan
Marshall
Marshall
Blackmun
White
Blackmun
Lowest %
% Agreement
Justice 1
37--1 Douglas
40 Douglas
38 Douglas
28 Frankfurter
34 Frankfurter
37 Black
32 Douglas
42 Black
29 Douglas
36 Douglas
33 Douglas
46 Black
Douglas
36 Black
44 Douglas
36 Douglas
26 Douglas
28 Douglas
Rehnquist 28 Douglas
Lowest %
Agree-
ment
Justice 2
Harlan
Harlan
Harlan
Douglas
Douglas
Harlan
Harlan
Harlan
Harlan
Harlan
Harlan
Harlan
Harlan
Harlan
Burger
Harlan
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist1973 77 Burger
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1974 -77- Blackmun Powell 31 Douglas
1975 79 Burger Powell 20 Douglas
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Powell 36 Brennan
Powell
Marshall 32 Brennan
Blackmun 34 Brennan
Powell Marshall
69 White
Rehnquist
62 Brennan
70 White
Burger
69 Burger
69 White
Burger
Burger
66 Rehnquist
77 White
Burger
84 White
Burger
81 Burger
Powell
81 Powell
77 Rehnquist
83 White
85 Rehnquist
75 White
83 O'Connor
72 Kennedy
82 Rehnquist
72 Rehnquist
80 Rehnquist
78 O'Connor
30 Marshall
36 Marshall
37 Brennan
37 Marshall
46 Marshall
47 Marshall
37 Marshall
39 Marshall
Marshall
51 Marshall
47 Marshall
35 Marshall
39 Stevens
32 Blackmun
44 Stevens
38 Blackmun
Kennedy 41 Stevens
Kennedy 43 Stevens
Rehnquist
White
Burger
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Scalia
Scalia
O'Connor
Scalia
Scalia
Scalia
Thomas
Thomas
Thomas
Thomas
2007]
Powell
Powell
Powell
Rehnquist
O'Connor
Burger
Powell
Burger
O'Connor
O'Connor
O'Connor
O'Connor
Powell
Kennedy
Kennedy
Rehnquist
Souter
Souter
Kennedy
O'Connor
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1996 83 Rehnquist Kennedy 44 Stevens Scalia
Stevens Thomas
1997 85 Rehnquist Kennedy 47 Stevens Scalia
1998 76 Rehnquist O'Connor 37 Stevens Thomas
O'Connor Kennedy
1999 86 Rehnquist O'Connor 40 Stevens Scalia
2000 81 Rehnquist Kennedy 40 Stevens Scalia
2001 77 Rehnquist Kennedy 37 Souter Thomas
2002 79 Rehnquist Kennedy 44 Stevens Thomas
2003 78 Rehnquist O'Connor 39 Stevens Scalia
2004 73 O'Connor Kennedy 41 Stevens Thomas
Thomas Ginsburg
2005 96 O'Connor Souter 46 Stevens Alito
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Table 2 - Aggregate % Voting Agreement (1956-2005 Terms)
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Table3: Statistics about the 50 Aggregate Harmony Metric Values
(1956 - 2005 Terms)
(Calculated from 0 & N data from the Harvard Law Review)
Range of Aggregate Harmony Values 50% to 70%
Mean of Aggregate Harmony Values 59.16%
Median of Aggregate Harmony Values 59%
Mode of Aggregate Harmony Values 59% (7 Occurrences)
1St Quartile 0% to 55.25%
2nd Quartile 55.26% to 59.16
3d Quartile 59.16% to 62.75%
41h Quartile 62.76% to 100%
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Table 4 - Aggregate Co-Voting Statistics for the United States
Supreme Court by Chief Justice Tenure (1956-2005 Terms)
Cumulative Cumulative "Full
0 Count N Count Opin-ions"
Warren
(1956 to 1968)
Burger
(1969 to 1985)
Rehnquist
(1986 to 2004)
Roberts (2005)
28,972
47,500
40,620
1914
48,737 1485
83,923 2488
67,343 1913
2749
Table 4A - Aggregate Co-Voting Statistics for the United States
Supreme Court by Chief Justice Tenure:
Superlatives (1956-2005 Terms)
Highest %
Court % Agree-
ment
Justice 1
Warren
(1956 to
1968)
Burger
(1969 to
1985)
Rehnquist
(1986 to
2004)
Roberts
(2005)
Highest
% Agree-
ment
Justice 2
Lowest %
% Agreement
Justice 1
Lowest %
Agree-
ment
Justice 2
90 Brennan Marshall 38 Frankfurter Douglas
Douglas Harlan
76 Burger O'Connor 28 Douglas Rehnquist
77 Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Powell
Kennedy
42 Blackmun Thomas
96 O'Connor Souter 45 Stevens Alito
Court
Aggregate %
Agreement (0
Method)
20071
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Table 5 - Aggregate Co-Voting Statistics for the United States
Supreme Court
5 Year Bins (1956-2005 Terms)
Term Court
1956 to
1960
1961 to
1965
1966 to
1970
1971 to
1975
1976 to
1980
1981 to
1985
1986 to
1990
1991 to
1995
1996 to
2000
2001 to
2005
Warren
Warren
Warren /
Burger
Burger
Burger
Burger
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist
Rehnquist/
Roberts
Aggre-
gate %
Agree-
ment (0
Method)
56
62
59
56
54
59
59
61
63
62
Cumulative Cumulative Average
O Count N Count Yearly No.
of "Full
Opinions"
10,761
10,786
11,101
14,214
12,984
16,626
14,127
10,275
9477
8655
19,385
17,390
18,715
25,166
24,053
27,951
24,008
16,937
15,157
13990
114
110
117
154
140
160
139
95
85
80
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Chart 3 - Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court (1956-2005 Terms)
[Spatial distribution based on the percentage of co-voting in Su-
preme Court opinions. Rendered with Pajek.]
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Chart 4 - Non-Unanimous Cases (1994-2003 Terms) (Spatial dis-
tribution based on co-voting using MDS and the software pro-
gram R.) [Photos used by permission: Collection, The Su-
preme Court Historical Society.]
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Chart 5 - Freedom of Speech Cases (1994-2003 Terms) (Spatial
distribution based on co-voting using MDS and the software
program R.) [Photos used by permission: Collection, The Su-
preme Court Historical Society.]
uo!suaw!c]
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Chart 6 - Frequency of Voting Blocks in 5-4 Cases (1994-2003
Terms) [Photos used by permission: Collection, The Supreme
Court Historical Society.]
1--0-- 81
N- (0
0 .- )((D0
_) E
0
0 2 0
C)C
--J -
o
E
C: '2
ca
4)
*0
C144
HeinOnline  -- 24 Const. Comment. 256 2007
2007] AGGREGATE HARMONY METRIC 257
Chart 7 - Thresholding (Voting Together > 50%) Reveals Ideo-
logical Cliques (1994-2003 Terms, Non-Unanimous Cases) [Pho-
tos used by permission: Collection, The Supreme Court Histori-
cal Society.] Voting frequencies represented as the edge weight
between nodes and presented visually as a graph. (Rendered
with Pajek using a stocahstic, spring force algorithm.)
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Chart 8 - Thresholding (Voting Together > 49%) Reveals Ideo-
logical Cliques (1994-2003 Terms, Non-Unanimous Cases) [Pho-
tos used by permission: Collection, The Supreme Court Histori-
cal Society.] Voting frequencies represented as the edge weight
between nodes and presented visually as a graph. (Rendered
with Pajek using a stocahstic, spring force algorithm.)
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Table 6 - 25 Highest Co-Voting Percentages (1956-2005 Terms)
(Calculated from 0 & N data from the Harvard Law Review)
Number
of Cases
Rank Justice 1 Justice 2 Percentage Heard
Together
1 O'Connor Roberts 91 23
2 Warren Marshall 88 178
3 Reed Clark 85 40
3 Fortas Marshall 85 132
5 Warren Brennan 82 1406
5 Scalia Roberts 82 78
5 Roberts Alito 82 39
8 Warren Fortas 80 391
9 Kennedy Roberts 79 78
9 Brennan Fortas 79 394
11 Thomas Roberts 78 77
12 Brennan Goldberg 77 308
12 Rehnquist Kennedy 77 1670
14 Burger O'Connor 76 790
14 Warren Goldberg 76 308
16 Warren White 75 770
16 O'Connor Kennedy 75 1685
18 Souter Roberts 74 78
18 Breyer Roberts 74 78
18 Powell O'Connor 74 888
18 Rehnquist O'Connor 74 2669
18 White Kennedy 74 688
23 Ginsburg Roberts 73 78
24 Burger Powell 72 2070
25 Reed Warren 71 42
25 White O'Connor 71 1694
25 Clark Brennan 71 1169
25 Clark White 71 537
2007]
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Table 7 - 25 Highest Co-Voting Percentages of Justices Deciding 100
or More Cases Together (1956-2005 Terms) (Calculated from 0 & N
data from the Harvard Law Review)
Number
of Cases
Rank Justice 1 Justice 2 Percentage Heard
Together
1 Warren Marshall 88 178
2 Fortas Marshall 85 132
3 Warren Brennan 82 1406
4 Warren Fortas 80 391
5 Brennan Fortas 79 394
6 Brennan Goldberg 77 308
6 Rehnquist Kennedy 77 1670
8 Burger O'Connor 76 790
8 Warren Goldberg 76 308
10 Warren White 75 770
10 O'Connor Kennedy 75 1685
12 Powell O'Connor 74 888
12 Rehnquist O'Connor 74 2669
12 White Kennedy 74 688
15 Burger Powell 72 2070
16 White O'Connor 71 1694
16 Clark Brennan 71 1169
16 Clark White 71 537
19 White Souter 70 335
19 Souter Ginsburg 70 1071
19 Burger Rehnquist 70 2166
19 Powell Scalia 70 147
19 White Powell 70 2215
24 O'Connor Souter 69 1337
24 Scalia Kennedy 69 1758
24 Souter Breyer 69 976
24 Rehnquist Scalia 69 1892
24 Rehnquist Powell 69 2200
24 White Burger 69 2464
24 Clark Fortas 69 195
24 Kennedy Souter 69 1404
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Table 8- 25 Lowest Co-Voting Percentages (1956-2005 Terms)
(Calculated from 0 & N data from the Harvard Law Review)
Number
of Cases
Rank Justice 1 Justice 2 Percentage Heard
Together
1 Douglas Rehnquist 28 513
2 Douglas Burger 35 792
3 Douglas Blackmun 36 695
4 Douglas Powell 37 495
5 Frankfurter Douglas 38 588
6 Douglas Harlan II 39 1633
7 Marshall Rehnquist 41 2819
7 Douglas Burton 41 231
7 Black Harlan II 41 1628
10 Blackmun Thomas 42 284
10 Brennan Rehnquist 42 2706
10 Douglas Whittaker 42 523
13 Black Frankfurter 43 576
13 Marshall Scalia 43 685
13 Harlan II Goldberg 43 308
16 Stevens Thomas 44 1266
17 Stevens Alito 45 40
17 Black Burton 45 222
19 Douglas Stewart 46 1963
19 Frankfurter Warren 46 587
19 Brennan Scalia 46 565
19 Stevens Scalia 46 1978
19 Marshall Burger 46 2424
24 Black Whittaker 47 515
24 Brennan Burger 47 2440
24 Marshall O'Connor 47 1462
2007]
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Table 9 - 25 Most Cases Heard Together (1956-2005 Terms)
(Calculated from the N data from the Harvard Law Review)
Number
Rank Justice 1 Justice 2 Co-Voting of CasesPercentage Heard
Together
1 Brennan White 59 3786
2 Rehnquist Stevens 51 3432
3 White Marshall 54 3285
4 White Blackmun 64 3257
5 Brennan Marshall 61 3140
6 Blackmun Rehnquist 58 3137
7 White Rehnquist 68 3078
8 Marshall Blackmun 53 3005
9 Brennan Blackmun 54 2884
10 Marshall Rehnquist 41 2819
11 Brennan Stewart 57 2812
12 Brennan Rehnquist 42 2706
13 Stevens O'Connor 55 2696
14 Rehnquist O'Connor 74 2669
15 Blackmun Stevens 54 2536
16 White Stevens 56 2472
17 White Burger 69 2464
18 Brennan Burger 47 2440
19 Stewart White 62 2428
20 Marshall Burger 46 2424
21 Burger Blackmun 66 2349
22 Marshall Stevens 50 2219
23 White Powell 70 2215
24 Douglas Brennan 60 2213
25 Rehnquist Powell 69 2200
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Table 10 - Statistics About the 193 Justice Pairings over the 50 Years
of the Dataset (1956-2005 Terms)
Total Number of Possible Justice Pairings 193
Range Of Co-Voting Percentages 28% to 91%
Mean of Co-Voting Percentages 59.93%
Median of Co-Voting Percentages 60%
Mode of Co-Voting Percentages 58%
(10 Occurrences)
1st Quartile 0% to 53%
2nd Quartile 53.01% to 59.93%
3rd Quartile 59.94% to 68%
4tn Quartile 68.01% to 100%
2007]
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Chart 9
Histogram of Percentages of Co-Voting, 0 Method
I I I I I I 1
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0
Percentage of Co-Voting (expressed as a decimal)
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